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Abstract
George Santayana (1863-1952) appears emotionally distant and personally
uncommitted in many of his writings. In what may have been a related phenome-
non, he does not seem to have committed to any school of philosophy, but rather to
draw from many of the available schools when it suited him. In this article, we
assess his constantly changing use of different philosophies and its implications for
both philosophy and politics.
Keywords: Santayana, Scepticism, Nihilism, Epicureanism, Materialism,
Cynicism, Spinozism, Political Life.
Many readers have remarked upon the emotional distance or lack of commit-
ment in many of the writings of George Santayana (1863-1952). Ever the critic, he
rarely stakes his own claims and often seems quite detached from the issues he is
writing about. We have here a case study of the importance of the emotional com-
mitment of the philosopher or political thinker. What difference does it make if a
thinker is hot or cold, outgoing or reserved, fully committed or wanly detached? A
special feature of this case is that although most of his work was philosophy or lite-
rature, Santayana also wrote a major book about politics, so we have the opportu-
nity to observe the effects of his general lack of emotional involvement in his poli-
tical thought as well. 
Emotional distance, lack of commitment, lack of involvement, reserve, and
detachment are not customary technical concepts in the study of the works of
important philosophers, so we are exploring a relatively new area in the history of
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philosophy. We are not qualified to use these terms in any technical psychological
sense. We use them only in the common sense meaning that any reader will recog-
nize, and we hope that the meanings and family resemblances among this cluster of
ideas will emerge from our treatment. They bring out one dimension of philosophy
as something lived and related to the philosopher’s personality that has been empha-
sized in some work on the history of philosophy of the last several decades.2
In conversation with a biographer, Santayana described his position as “like…
the ancient Cynics or Sceptics, with a little Epicureanism to soften it”.3 We take this
and other self-descriptions of Santayana as warrant for understanding him in terms
of several ancient (and modern) schools, sometimes at the same time and sometimes
alternatively. It is also the case that Santayana used the vocabulary of philosophy in
his own idiosyncratic way. He did not feel bound by the meanings attributed to phi-
losophical words throughout the history of philosophy. It is a mistake to assume that
his usage is the same or similar to the vocabulary current in contemporary philo-
sophy. Rather, one must compare and contrast in order to distinguish his usage from
traditional and contemporary usage. We are going to claim that he used the word
scepticism variously for thoroughly sceptical scepticism, for dogmatic scepticism,
and for nihilism; and that he used the term animal faith variously for Epicureanism,
materialism, Spinozism, and cynicism. Analyzing his meanings will help us contri-
bute to the inventory and classification of the philosophical families of these scho-
ols, and of their influence on political thought.
Santayana wrote a great deal and thus a full analysis of his personality and phi-
losophy would require a book-length analysis of all of his work. To keep this arti-
cle manageable we will have to center our analysis on just a few of his works in
order to document in sufficient detail the connections between what we are calling
his emotional distance and his philosophical and political ideas. Our chief text will
be Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923), considered by many to be the epitome of
his mature philosophy.4 And for the politics, we will rely mostly on Dominations
and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government (1951), published
when Santayana was 88 years old.5 We will also draw where helpful on his autobi-
ography, letters, and some of his other works.
It is also the case that Santayana is something of a moving target. Philosophy
was a process of discovery and reflection for him, and his thought could evolve insi-
de any one book, let alone between books. Nevertheless, we think a core substance
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and attitude can be identified, and that is what we try to do here. From early on in
his career, we see a constant reserve, diffidence, and detachment which we are
calling emotional distance in philosophy.
1. Scepticism and distance
We can start with the point that almost all authors have called Santayana a scep-
tic.6 But what does that mean? In keeping with his reserve, Santayana often writes
in Scepticism and Animal Faith of “a true sceptic…” (SF4) or “a thorough scep-
tic…” (SF5) or asserts that “the sceptic thinks himself shrewd…” (SF8) without
admitting that this might be his own position. Often he attacks scepticism for going
too far, as we shall see below. But on rare occasions he refers to “the scepticism I
am defending” (SF49) and claims that “I have imitated the Greek sceptics” (SF308).
He could be describing himself when he asserts that “they turned their scepticism
into an expression of personal dignity and an argument for detachment” (SF308).
Let us consider what the latter could mean. 
Although most philosophers know that scepticism has been the label for a scho-
ol or schools of thought since the 5th century B.C., not all of those who use the word
know or care much about the tradition, and it has often been used in idiosyncratic
ways. Even the ancient Greeks recognized that the word was understood in diffe-
rent ways at different times and for different purposes. Santayana is both a part of
the tradition and no exception to the rule that many members of the tradition did
not pay careful attention to their place in its history. He tried to place others where
they belonged: “Transcendental criticism in the hands of Kant and his followers
was a sceptical instrument used by persons who were not sceptics” because they
made “many uncritical assumptions, such as… that the notions of nature, history,
or mind which they led many people to adopt were the right or standard notions on
these subjects, and that it was glorious, rather than ignominious or sophistical, to
build on these principles an encyclopedia of false sciences and to call it knowled-
ge” (SF6). A “true sceptic”, he wrote, “will begin by throwing over all those aca-
demic conventions as so much confessed fiction” (SF4). But, as we shall see, this
did not mean that he did much to situate himself within the tradition of persons who
were sceptics.
What others have labelled scepticism in Santayana may be rather a sort of dis-
tancing from the world and from other people, a detachment or unwillingness to
take it seriously and take it to heart. This distancing from the world began relative-
ly early, if we may trust his own account. As he tells it in Persons and Places, at the
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age of 30 he began a slow but inexorable withdrawal from the world, a gradual and
phlegmatic separating of himself from everything.7 He called this his “metanoia”, a
philosophical, religious, psychological, and social catharsis that replaced his rela-
tionships with the real world with distancing and disillusionment (PP423, 427). He
explored the idea that “a perfect love is founded on despair” (PP428-9). In a letter,
he wrote that “my philosophy has always been that disillusion is the only safe foun-
dation for happiness”.8 The eventual consequence of this would be his resignation
from Harvard, and his peripatetic, uncommitted, unrooted life in England, France,
and Italy. As he put it, he would live in the world of ideas, in what he later called
the “Realms of Being”. As his poetry reflected, his withdrawal into the ideal and
eternal echoed of Plato and Platonism.9
The expected social life and morals of a Bostonian and Spaniard of the elite of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries demanded worldly success and reli-
gious solidarity which predetermined a sort of consensus of self-satisfaction and
satisfaction with the things around them of the elite. Santayana was dissatisfied with
this uncritical optimism, and affirmed to the contrary that our mere existence is
already a big risk, always subject to chance and containing as much risk of failure
as of success. Whereas in Boston people focused only on moving forward and win-
ning, Santayana wanted to know where he was going and what was the purpose
before, as he put it, picking up his weapons (PP410).
The philosophy of success that ruled in the young and shining America of his
day ran against the feelings and character of our philosopher.10 The point of depar-
ture of his philosophical project was sceptical in the sense of reacting viscerally
against the dogmas of the day which seemed to capture so completely the most
active minds of the time. In part, this was because he saw philosophy as like a jun-
gle, where “one tree strangles another, and luxuriance itself is murderous” (SF8).
Thus, Santayana saw his objective as to revitalize for the twentieth century a cer-
tain sceptical attitude with respect to the wide and varied catalogue of dogmatic the-
ories available in the splendid philosophical bazaar of the time.11
John Christian Laursen & Ramón Román Alcalá George Santayana and emotional distance...
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2015): 7-28
10
7 Cf. Santayana (1986), pp. 417-429. Hereafter cited in the text with the letters PP. 
Santayana writes that three events led to his withdrawal: the death of his “last real friend”, Warwick
Potter; the death of his father, which “helped to disintoxicate my mind”; and the marriage of his sis-
ter, Susana. Santayana (1986), pp. 423-425.
8 Santayana (2002), vol. 5, II, p. 233.
9 See the analysis of his poem, “Resignation” (1888), later revised as “The Pessimist” in “Six Wise
Fools”, in García Martín (2002), p. 135.
10 Santayana was a devastating crític of the self-proclaimed moral and intellectual elites of the United
States, writing that they “seemed to be uniform: earnest, meager, vague, scattered, and hopeful” (PP
411). The admirable qualities here, “earnest” and “hopeful”, are undercut by their association with
other qualities that make the whole picture look rather pitiful. Cf. Santayana (2009), pp. 39-50. 
11 Santayana always opposed the most influential philosophy of his day: the idealism of Kant, Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel which dominated in the universities of the United States and Great Britain dur-
ing his years at Harvard. See Seaton (2009), p. xiii.
A careful reading of his works helps us clarify his understanding of scepticism.
We believe that his scepticism is more aesthetic than epistemological, more gestur-
al than profound, and more light-hearted and Epicurean than serious and
Pyrrhonian. Let us start with a comparison with the Greek sceptical traditions.
2. Greek Scepticism of the Presocratic and Academic Traditions
It is customary to say that in its origins Greek scepticism proposed a radical
cure, using a medical analogy, for excessive claims of knowledge and truth. As a
sort of purge, scepticism seeks to cure the arrogance of the dogmatic thinkers and
humble the purveyors of truth. It is an attitude of criticism that becomes sponta-
neous and natural, accompanying all thought, and thus a way of life (agog e) rather
than a doctrine.12 And perhaps it is precisely for that reason that some sceptics do
not even realize that they are part of a tradition of thought. 
Although the history of scepticism as a philosophical (or anti-philosophical) tra-
dition is complex and often obscure, two basic schools have been widely accepted.
Academic scepticism derived more or less straightforwardly from Plato’s Academy,
and can be traced through his successors in that institution.13 The more radical
Pyrrhonism has a more unsure pedigree that associates its founder, Pyrrho of Elis,
with Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus, and Saturninus Citenas. This school may
have been a reconstruction by Aenesidemus mainly in order to attack the modera-
tion of the Academy.14
At the beginning of his most famous work, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus
Empiricus distinguished three philosophical systems: the dogmatic, the Academic,
and the sceptical. The dogmatists declared that they had found the truth (although
each had found a different truth). The Academics and sceptics could be distinguished
because the former declared the truth inapprehensible while the latter suspended
judgment about its apprehensibility while continuing to look for it.15 Thus, as Aulus
Gellius put it, the Academics were a sort of dogmatic sceptics since they took the
proposition that “nothing can be comprehended” as a truth, while the true sceptics,
also known as the Pyrrhonians, suspended judgment even about that.16 It is safe to
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theless may be happy. See Román (2005), pp. 35-51.
13 The Platonic Academy can be reconstructed from Plato through Speussipus to Xenocrates, Polemon,
Crates of Athens, Crantor, Arcesilaus, Carneades, Clitomachus, Metrodorus of Stratonica, Philo of
Larissa, and Antiochus of Ascalon. See Román (2007). 
14 On the late invention of Pyrrhonism as a school, see Román (2012), pp. 111-130.
15 Sextus Empiricus (1933), p. 3.
16 “But although the Pyrrhonians and the Academics express themselves very much alike about these
matters, yet they are thought to differ from each other both in certain other respects and especially for
say that Santayana’s philosophy contains each of these elements. Some of his asser-
tions are dogmatic, some follow the Academic path of declaring things unknowable,
and some come closer to suspending judgment while continuing to investigate. But
the last of these are just gestures in that direction, and we argue below that on the
whole Santayana cannot be characterized as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. Rather, he puts
various elements together to create his own idiosyncratic scepticism.17
As already mentioned, scepticism could be defended against charges that it
undermined itself if it were conceived of as not a doctrine subject to such undermin-
ing, but as an activity or way of life.18 It was a way of life with three important fea-
tures: 1. it could be incorporated into ordinary, daily life; 2. it provided solutions to
the problem of knowledge: living by good reasons or probabilities in the absence of
knowledge (Academic scepticism) or suspending judgment about it (Pyrrhonian
scepticism); and 3. in the case of the Pyrrhonists, the aphasia, or speechlessness,
that suspension of judgment induces and ataraxia, or the tranquility that follows it,
may lead us to happiness. The last of these, also translated as freedom from distur-
bance, was the common goal of the stoics, Epicureans, and sceptics. Not much has
been written about exactly what the tranquil life of the sceptic would be like. We
suggest that Santayana’s writings can be understood as one philosopher’s path to
ataraxia. 
Santayana starts with the constant and continual experience of errors and per-
plexities in the history of philosophy, and sees some sort of scepticism as necessary
for anyone who does not want to appear ridiculous and negligent in philosophy.
This scepticism, which has a correcting and repairing function (SF69-70), most
likely can be traced to the Greek sources, but he does not cite them as we might
expect. He does not mention Arcesilaus, Carneades, Clitomachus, or Philo from the
Academic school, nor Pyrrho, Timon, Aenesidemus, or Sextus from the
Pyrrhonians. 
Instead, the language Santayana uses to define scepticism, sometimes rather
aggressively at odds with the traditions of scepticism, is of an unusual variety and
aesthetic beauty. For example, he describes scepticism as a “form of belief”, “a sus-
picion of error about facts”, and claims to use it to “clear my mind of illusion, even
at the price of intellectual suicide” (SF8,10). “Scepticism is not sleep”, it “is an
exercise, not a life”, it “is the chastity of the intellect” (SF42,69). His examples are
many and varied, bringing us to one of the main problems in understanding
John Christian Laursen & Ramón Román Alcalá George Santayana and emotional distance...
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2015): 7-28
12
this reason – because the Academics do, as it were, “comprehend” the very fact that nothing can be
comprehended, while the Pyrrhonians assert that not even that can by any means be regarded as true,
because nothing is regarded as true” (Aulus Gellius (1927), vol. II, p. 313.
17 Santayana was not alone in inventing his own scepticism. His contemporary Michael Oakeshott also
paid very little attention to the traditions and developed his own form. See Laursen (2005), pp. 37-55,
esp. pp. 40-41.
18 See Laursen (2004), pp. 201-23 and Laursen (2005), pp. 167-188.
Santayana: his style. The fact that he is a brilliant and creative writer means that he
belongs to the class of philosophers who create original ideas and concepts by their
sparkling use of language alone. This can have the downside of the writer paying
little or no attention to the history and development of the ideas and concepts he
puts to his own use. If, on the one hand, an excess of attention to tradition might
asphyxiate creativity and originality, on the other hand forgetting all connection
with it may lead to a sort of hyperventilation such that the philosopher tries to fill
in too much that is already there and in the process faints from the exertion.
Abandoning the tradition may save the philosopher from having to admit that some
of his assumptions may not be justified, but it also leads to a loss of the terminolog-
ical precision that a tradition can provide. As has been said, the medium and the
message are inseparable, and sometimes the substance of the work is hard to find
behind the brilliant style in which it is expressed.19
The foregoing means that some of the time when Santayana refers to scepticism
he is making no reference to the recognized Greek sceptics, nor for that matter to
later thinkers generally recognized as sceptics. He also identifies as sceptics or pre-
cursors of scepticism many figures who may have pioneered some aspect of scep-
ticism but who are generally better understood as dogmatists or philosophers who
think they have arrived at truths. Citing Parmenides, Democritus, Gorgias,
Protagoras, and the sophists in general, Santayana moves paradoxically between
contrary positions, variously tending without wishing to toward an inevitable objec-
tivism or naturalism, and then implying without intending it an absolute subjec-
tivism and nihilism (to which we will return below).20
There were definite limits to Santayana’s scepticism. He claimed to “push scep-
ticism as far as I logically can” (SF10), but in fact he pulled back from it. In an
attempt to undermine scepticism as suspension of belief, he asserted that “scepti-
cism is accordingly a form of belief” and that “dogma cannot be abandoned” (SF8).
In a reductio ad absurdum, he claimed that scepticism “will lead me to deny exis-
tence to any datum, whatever it may be” (SF35); “scepticism may thus be carried
to the point of denying change and memory, and the reality of all facts” (SF40); and
the strongest of all, “nothing given exists” (SF42). But of course these are all dog-
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entire skeptical tradition” (p. 30), but Lachs does not seem to have much knowledge of the ancient
sceptics: perhaps they fall under his description of pre-Cartesian sceptics as “heretics to be dealt with
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the cynics, sceptics, and Epicureans (see note 41 below). On subjectivism and objectivism, see
Calogero (1932), pp. 247-251 and Dupréel (1948), pp. 68-70.
matic claims, and would not have been accepted by the Greek sceptics, who would
suspend judgment about them. In spite of his distancing from so many things, he
seems to have genuinely cared about not taking scepticism as far as the collapse of
philosophy. The ancient sceptics were not so genteel; they do not seem to have
cared if philosophy was undermined. They could live without it.
3. Pyrrhonism, Academic skepticism, dogmatism 
Let us evaluate Santayana’s philosophy in the terms of Sextus Empiricus’s three
classes of philosophy. We shall start, in reverse order, with Pyrrhonism. There are
echoes of the Pyrrhonists in some of his arguments. For example, when he observes
that “complete scepticism is accordingly not inconsistent with animal faith”, he
explains that “I may yield to the suasion of instinct, and practice the arts with a
humble confidence… [and] what guides me is not illusion but habit” (SF105).
These two points read like they were taken from Sextus Empiricus’s list of the four
rules by which the Pyrrhonist lives in the absence of truths: “the guidance of
nature,… the constraint of the passions,… the tradition of laws and traditions.. and
instruction in the arts”.21 When he adds that “the intuitions which accompany habit
are signs…” and that he regards “the images of sense and science” as “graphic sym-
bols for home and for the way there” (SF105-106), he sounds like he is relying on
Sextus’s explanation of the “associative” or “commemorative” signs by which the
sceptic lives: they do not tell us anything about reality or truth, as “indicative” signs
are expected to do, but they do get us home.22
Nevertheless, these gestures toward Pyrrhonism do not make Santayana a
Pyrrhonist. Perhaps the strongest argument for ruling out the label of Pyrrhonism is
his naturalism. As he put it, “in natural philosophy I am a decided materialist
–apparently the only one living” (SFvii), and that naturalism underlies many of his
arguments. Yet Pyrrhonists cannot be naturalists. In a classic article Sullivan assert-
ed that Santayana’s scepticism was founded on the same basis as the ancient scep-
tics, on the conviction that nothing is certain.23 But he adds that in rejecting knowl-
edge the sceptics did not reject the natural world, but rather accepted it in its majesty
and inscrutableness, affirming that “A sceptic is necessarily a naturalist”.24 No
John Christian Laursen & Ramón Román Alcalá George Santayana and emotional distance...
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2015): 7-28
14
21 Sextus Empiricus (1933), p. 17.
22 Sextus Empiricus (1935), pp. 319, 339-343.
23 Sullivan (1951), p. 86.
24 “The Sceptics in denying knowledge did not deny nature; by implication they asserted her Sphinx-
like majesty. Ignorance is not ignorance, if of nothing, and in their absolute scepticism the Pyrrhonists
saluted what they could not embrace, a nature independent of them, a power vast and inscrutable”:
Sullivan (1951), p. 86.
sceptic of the ancient schools would say anything like that. They lived in a world of
appearances, with no claims to knowledge about the nature behind them.
Let us explain why Pyrrhonism is not a naturalism. Eusebius reported that
Pyrrho’s “pupil Timon says that whoever wants to be happy must consider these
three questions: first, how are things by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we
adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this atti-
tude? According to Timon, Pyrrho declared that things are equally indifferent
(adiáphora), unmeasurable (astáthmeta) and inarbitrable (anepíkrita).”25 Timon
began with the problem of how to achieve happiness, and the answer came from the
theory of knowledge. The intention was predominantly ethical, and the goal was
ataraxia or tranquility.26 Now, there are several ways of understanding this decla-
ration. One is that Pyrrho meant that nature really is indifferent, unmeasurable, and
inarbitrable. On this account, the achievement of ataraxia requires an answer to
questions about nature and whether it can be determined and known. Love of
knowledge and the drive to know are necessary and the only route to happiness. But
there cannot be much of a naturalism because, in Pyrrho’s judgment, nature is
“equally indifferent, unmeasurable, and inarbitrable”: we can know nothing about
it beyond this.
On a second interpretation Pyrrho provides a theory of the limits of our ability
to know anything about the world. If we cannot know anything, even if the world
might be measurable and arbitrable by others, we can say nothing at all about it that
will be either true or false. Thus, we must be, as Timon put it, “undogmatic and
uncommitted and unswayed, saying of each and every thing, that it is no more than
it is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not”.27 On this reading, naturalism
would consist of only the statement that we cannot understand nature. Yet a theory
of naturalism is expected to tell us more, and provide us with guidance for living. 
There is also a reading of the foregoing passage that holds that Pyrrho is not
really claiming anything about nature or about our abilities. Read through the lens
of Sextus Empiricus’s later elaborations, Pyrrho is only saying that things seem to
be indifferent, unmeasurable, and inarbitrable, and that it is not worth any more
trouble trying to sort them out. This is not, then, a theory about nature, but rather an
eschewing of the need to know anything about nature. It is an anti-philosophical
way of living with the world, more thoroughly sceptical than any theory that says
that we need to know something about the world in order to classify it as unknow-
able. Like the other interpretations, this leaves no room for naturalism, which by
definition must be a theory of nature and how it works. Pyrrho does not have one,
or need one. If Santayana has one, then he is not a consistent Pyrrhonist. 
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Santayana recognizes Academic scepticism only in order to refute its claims to
thorough-going scepticism. At the end of Skepticism and Animal Faith he argues
that “if we assert that one thing is more probable than another, as did the sceptics of
the Academy, we have adopted a definite belief, we profess to have some hold on
the nature of things at large” (SF308). This can be understood as what he calls ani-
mal faith: “this belief in nature, with a little experience and good sense to fill in the
picture, is almost enough by way of belief. Nor can a man honestly believe less”
(SF308). That means that his interpretation of Academic scepticism makes it simi-
lar to his own animal faith; both are dogmatic about something. 
Santayana observes that the more dogmatic a scepticism is, the more it tends
toward nihilism. A really thorough-going scepticism is “driven back to a nihilism
which only silence and death could express consistently” (SF168). He also argues
that “total dogmatic scepticism is evidently an impossible attitude” and then adds
that “I must revise the premisses of this nihilism” (SF171). Nevertheless, his own
scepticism tends toward a nihilism close to Parmenides or Gorgias, rather than
toward the sceptics.28 Some of the dogmatic, decisive, and radical expressions that
we have reviewed above seem to express such nihilism. As we have seen, chapter
7 of Scepticism and Animal Faith is titled “Nothing given exists”, a positive decla-
ration that is rather close to the first thesis of Gorgias’s “On Non-being”, which is
that “nothing exists”.29 Santayana’s intention is to prepare the way for the Realm of
Matter (physics or perhaps psychology), but this Realm, open only to animal faith,
according to Santayana, “would not concern the sceptic”, who only attacks claims
to truth and knowledge (SF42).
For Santayana reality was rotten; he looked at it with aversion; he was angry
with it – all of which drove him to hold it at a distance and suspend judgment about
it, even in his youth.30 Having determined to turn his back on reality, Santayana
employed scepticism as nihilism to justify his radical thesis, his flight to essences.
If reality and existence are profoundly ugly and unjust, then beauty may only be
found in the imagination. Thus his scepticism as nihilism is limited in scope, a point
of departure for the recovery of the Realms of Being. It is not that the indetermina-
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thirdly, that even if anything is apprehensible, yet of a surety it is inexpressible and incommunicable
to one’s neighbor”. Sextus Empiricus (1935), p. 35.
30 PP166. His youthful idea that “existence was profoundly ugly and wrong” did not change with the
passage of time.
tion and indifference or confusion of the world lead him to doubt the reality that sur-
rounds us, but rather the lack of beauty in the world brings him to reject it. He seems
to have participated in a certain vital and moral pessimism in certain philosophical
circles of the beginning of the twentieth century that led to an almost transcenden-
tal desperation that, in the absence of religion, had devastating consequences.
Santayana’s response was a pessimism about the capacity of philosophy, a des-
peration about reason and rationality. One could say that Santayana repeated the
pattern of the Spanish classic, Life is a Dream, by Calderón de la Barca.31 A kind
of fatalism marked the character of the Spanish-American philosopher, who
observed that there were no advantages or benefits in the real world, and that all is
vanity.32 Life is a dream and all of the impressions of experience are illusions
(SF51,61). 
Santayana’s nihilism has been the subject of controversy. Daniel Moreno argues
that it is not a destructive nihilism as believed by Luis Farré, nor a “courteous, con-
servative nihilism” provoked by the First World War, as asserted by A. Woodward,
but an “ironic nihilism”, “without stridency nor in the service of anything, aristo-
cratic”.33 This is a nihilism inherited, according to Moreno, from Socratic irony.34
If there is something to be said for this interpretation in its broadest outlines, it
seems to overlook the point that there is more than “splendid isolation” in
Scepticism and Animal Faith.35 There is a desire for philosophical destruction, a
strong critique of reality and of all that exists which is closer to Gorgias’s radical
nihilism than to Pyrrhonian scepticism. Santayana distances himself from the tenta-
tiveness, self-confessed lack of surety, and interpretive honesty of the sceptics,
making it seem like his professed scepticism is more of a pose in the process of
uncovering the truth, rather than a stance that really confronts the weakness of
knowledge and the diversity of morals.36 It is negative about truth, and yet confi-
dent in that negative judgment. 
Thus Santayana’s “scepticism” is often dogmatic, often closer to nihilism, not
derived from a confrontation with equipollent conflicts between things and ideas
like that of the ancients. If we are right, the title of Santayana’s book might better
have been Nihilism and Animal Faith. In the catalogue of scepticisms, Santayana’s
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31 “¿Qué es la vida? Un frenesí./ ¿Qué es la vida? Una ilusión,/ una sombra, una ficción,/ y el mayor
bien es pequeño;/ que toda la vida es sueño,/ y los sueños, sueños son”. Calderón de la Barca (1968),
p. 74.
32 This idea was developed by Christian preachers, according to Santayana (SF297).
33 Moreno (2007), pp. 27-36, esp. p. 30. See Farré (1953), p. 79. Woodward (1988), p. 121.
34 Moreno (2007), pp. 30-31.
35 Ibidem. 
36 Irving Singer calls this attitude a “heuristic pose”, suggesting that the scepticism of Santayana is a
stage on the way to the faith of animal nature. See Singer (2000), p. 19. Angel M. Faerna argues that
Santayana’s purposes are speculative in Faerna (2007), p. 60.
should be understood as oscillating among Academic scepticism, Pyrrhonian scep-
ticism, and a dogmatic, nihilistic scepticism.37
Santayana does not dare to go as far as some of the ancient sceptics. Faced with
the void, he vacillates. Instead of continuing along the path of thorough-going scep-
ticism, as uncomfortable and disagreeable as it might have been, he breaks with it.
He declares with disquieting lucidity that “physics and theology, to which most
philosophies are confined, are dubious in their first principles”, but then he backs
away, weakly hoping to save something: “which is not to say that nothing in them
is credible” (SF308). Without presenting any argument he decides that life and
philosophical discussion require us to avoid this philosophical suicide. It is his epis-
temological impatience, surely of moral derivation, that makes him pull back from
his own confession, at the beginning of the book, where he had said that “I stand in
philosophy exactly where I stand in daily life; I should not be honest otherwise. I
accept the same miscellaneous witnesses, bow to the same obvious facts, make con-
jectures no less instinctively, and admit the same encircling ignorance” (SFvi). 
“Among the Greek sceptics there were noble minds”, Santayana asserted
(SF308).38 But he was not consistently sceptical. As he put it, “I have imitated the
Greek sceptics in calling doubtful everything that, in spite of common sense, any
one can possibly doubt… [but] life and even discussion forces me to break away
from a complete scepticism” (SF308). Thus, he believed “in discourse, in experi-
ence, in substance, in truth, and in spirit. All these objects may conceivably be illu-
sory. Belief in them, however, is not grounded on a prior probability, but all judg-
ments of probability are grounded on them. They express a rational instinct or
instinctive reason” (SF308). Santayana accused William James, Josiah Royce, and
others of something he called “the genteel tradition in American philosophy”.39 The
point was that although they were philosophers claiming to search for the truth, they
always pulled back from the edge of materialism and atheism, saving the moral and
religious pieties of New England Protestant gentlemen. Santayana’s own version of
gentility seems to have been to pull back from the edge of a thorough-going scep-
ticism, even if that meant indulging in nihilism. From the point of view of a consis-
tent sceptic, this failure of nerve deserves a line from a play: “he is not worthy of
the honey-comb, That shuns the hives because the bees have stings”.40
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37 Oscar L. González-Castán observes that “scepticism is not inconsistent with animal faith because
the sceptic sketched by Santayana has never relieved himself of common beliefs [that is, has never
really been a sceptic]”, which is yet another proof that Santayana’s “scepticism” is actually a dogma-
tism: González-Castán (2012), pp. 96-97.
38 This passage is confused in the first Spanish translation, Santayana (2002b) [orig. 1952]), where
“sceptics” is translated as “sofistas [sophists]” (p. 355) and “Protagoras” is translated as “Pitágoras”
twice (p. 353). These errors are corrected in the new translation, Santayana (2012), pp. 353-355.
39 Santayana (2009), passim.
40 “Let come what will, I mean to bear it out, And either live with glorious victorie, Or die with fame
4. Epicureanism, materialism, cynicism, Spinozism, and the escape from reality
William Ray Dennes drew attention long ago to Santayana’s Epicureanism, and
Roger Kimball also wrote of his Epicureanism and its goal of ataraxia.41 In a letter,
Santayana wrote that “I seem to hold my own in the world without faith, and almost
without the world…I have the Epicurean contentment, which was not far removed
from asceticism”.42 In Persons and Places he wrote that “Epicurus renounced most
of the things called pleasures, for the sake of peace, equanimity, and intelligence”,
and this could stand for a representation of Santayana himself (PP259). Satisfaction
with the here and now, which he cultivated, he also described as “Epicurean con-
tentment in being an accident in an accident” (PP411). And he wrote of his
“progress in the primrose path of Epicurean wisdom” (PP426). Thus there is some
justification of reading Santayana as oscillating among being a sceptic, a nihilist,
and an Epicurean. Each of the latter two are aspects of what he called “animal
faith”: what we think and live by without philosophical warrant. 
Epicureanism is also often understood as a materialism, and Santayana claimed
that at the age of seven or eight “I was already a calm materialist” (PP122). He
repeated many times, as we have already seen, that “in natural philosophy I am a
decided materialist” (SFvii).43 In Persons and Places he wrote that he had “made
the authority of things, as against the presumption of words or ideas, a principle of
my philosophy” and referred to people who thought like him as “we materialists”
(PP18). He described his materialism as a “constant sense of the animal basis of
spirit” and “disrespect for any claim on the part of spirit to govern the world”
(PP387). Materialism meant never dreaming “of rebelling against the despotism of
nature” (PP392). 
Santayana did not hesitate to attack the philosophy of his times. He made the
point that humans always move within perspectives: we glimpse the world of truth,
we think we know what it is in itself but we cannot really capture it, we can only
make approximations.44 Thus he despaired at the dogmatists, the vainglorious, and
the petulant who thought they had found the truth for all times and places. And he
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renown’d for Chivalrie: He is not worthy of the honey-comb, That shuns the hives because the bees
have stings”, Shakespeare (1734), Act III, Scene III, p. 1095. The attribution to Shakespeare is false;
it has also been attributed to Wentworth Smith. But the point remains.
41 Dennes (1951) p. 437; Kimball (2009), p. 189.
42 Santayana (2002), vol. 5, III, 297.
43 On Epicurean materialism, see Román (2002), pp 77 ff.
44 “That standard comprehensive description of any fact which neither I nor any man can ever whol-
ly repeat, is the truth about it” (SF266). A few years earlier José Ortega y Gasset published
Meditaciones del Quijote (1914), in which he claimed for the first time that every truth is a truth from
a perspective, valid only from that perspective, and complementing other perspectives: Ortega y
Gasset (1914), pp. 35-45.
rejected the pragmatists, with William James at their head, who insisted that they
could identify the value of items of knowledge for human life. Santayana rarely
worried about the consequences of action; his interests were in the speculative and
aesthetic realm, isolated from practice. He sought a viewpoint above good and bad,
above the preferences and evaluations of most people in daily life, in short, a view-
point from a distance. Thus he insisted against the pragmatists that thought is not
essentially instrumental or in service of other goals, but an experience and activity
in and for itself. It has its own laws of movement, and is not always trying to serve
our practical goals. This impotence for the purpose of achieving goals and truth
obliges him to remain at a distance from everything, observing but making no judg-
ment, in a kind of epoché or suspension of judgment which is not so much an epis-
temological or moral experience as an aesthetic experience.45 This seems consistent
with Epicureanism.
At times, Santayana reads more like an ancient cynic than an Epicurean or a
sceptic. Recall that he described his own position as “like… the ancient Cynics or
Sceptics, with a little Epicureanism to soften it”.46 Diogenes the Cynic spent most
of his time denouncing the moral failings of the society around him, while refusing
to take part as an active citizen.47 He went into the forum or the theater when every-
one else was leaving it, to make the point that one should not follow the herd. He
belonged to no party or group or team. He called himself a cosmopolites, or citizen
of the world. Diogenes lived austerely and simply so that he could live independ-
ently. A lot of this can be said for Santayana. He also called himself “a materialist,
cynic, and Tory in philosophy”, although, as always, this did not imply any effort to
closely follow the tradition of cynicism (PP392). Unlike Diogenes, he was a writer
and a philosopher. But he was one who maintained his distance and detachment
from the people and the society around him, criticizing them mostly in print. 
Some of Santayana’s philosophy may be of Spinozistic inspiration. Spinoza is
one of the few philosophers cited throughout Santayana’s work with great respect.
A recent interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy as the project of renaturalization
sounds like it could be applied to Santayana.48 As Van Meter Ames put it, “here is
Spinoza’s teaching that everything happens according to the ways of nature… and
that [people] should cherish a private liberty apart from state control”.49 The point
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45 Cf. Santayana (1905), pp. 205-235, esp. 213-214: “Thought is essentially practical in the sense that
but for thought no motion would be an action, no change a progress; but thought is in no way instru-
mental or servile; it is an experience realised, not a force to be used”.
46 Lind (1962), pp. 24, 15. 
47 See Laursen (2009), pp. 469-482. 
48 Sharp (2011). See what Santayana says about Spinoza in Santayana (2009), pp. 4, 12, 23, 29, 39,
69-71; Santayana (1923), pp. viii, 16, 179, 365; Santayana (1951), p. 18 (and possibly also p. 137,
where he refers to one of Spinoza’s key concepts, natura naturans).
49 Ames (1952), p. 208.
of both philosophers is that if we really understand nature, human nature, and the
way of the world, we get used to the idea that things happen as they do by nature,
and they do not faze us. We can remain emotionally calm in the face of everything
that nature does, and we try to stay below the radar of the state. This is not ancient
sceptical ataraxia based on suspension of judgment, but a sort of ataraxia drawn
from reflections on nature and government. This is yet another reason to recognize
Santayana’s philosophical distance from the ancient sceptics.
It may be suggested that Santayana distanced himself from Spinoza from time
to time. In Persons and Places he writes that “in spite of my profound attachment
to his system of nature, I miss in his moral sentiment precisely that Castilian dis-
dain and independence, that pagan lust and love of beauty” that Santayana attrib-
uted to his Spanish blood (PP12). Despite his usual preference for withdrawal, he
rejects Spinoza’s consent “to be led to pasture in fat meadows beside the still
waters. Quietness and personal frugality I love, but only in the shadow of historic
greatness and monumental grandeur of the will” (PP12). This expresses very well
Santayana’s preference for limiting his emotionalism to his intellectual life. As he
put it later, “the complete moralist must not only be sound in physics, but must be
inwardly inspired by a normal human soul and an adequate human tradition”:
“Spinoza was not a complete humanist. He had no idea of human greatness and no
sympathy with human sorrow” (PP235). This echoes a charge often made against
Santayana, and from his response to it we see that beneath the still waters of his
emotional detachment he did indeed believe that he had some attachments. But once
again he backed off from that commitment: “content, like Spinoza, with my small
share of [a Zion of “fugitive joys and sincere ecstasies”], I dislike all the quarrels
and panaceas of the political moralists” (PP502). What he seems to have liked best
about Spinoza was his commitment to philosophical liberty.50
5. The politics of divided loyalties
Our review of Santayana’s philosophical scepticism, nihilism, Epicureanism,
materialism, cynicism, and Spinozism prepares us for reading his politics. In
Dominations and Powers, Santayana described the ancient philosophers as “scatte-
red into sects politically either archaistic, with Plato, or indifferent with the Cynics,
Sceptics, and Epicureans, or with the Stoics and Neo-Pythagoreans intellectual or
mystical worshippers of the rational order of the cosmos” (337). It is pretty clear
where he stood among the ancient positions: some form of “indifferent”. The
themes we have seen of distance, detachment, withdrawal, and failure to take a
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stand in Santayana’s philosophy may be found in his political writings as well. Yet
another way of reading his scepticism is to emphasize his “divided loyalties”, as
recently expressed by Carlin Romano.51
Let us start with Santayana’s reaction to a political event that one might have
thought would be among the most likely to spark the passions of a Spaniard living
in the United States: the Spanish American War of 1898-99. As he recounts it in his
autobiography, William James was indignant about the American takeover of the
Philippines, but Santayana had no strong feelings about it. As one commentator puts
it, he was “never excessively impassioned”; he was detached, resigned, dispassion-
ate about the war; he limited himself to understanding it, and he also critically ana-
lyzed the posture of the anti-war intellectuals like William James as unrealistic mor-
alizing.52 One of his poems from those years, “The Pessimist”, begins with “I set
my heart on politics; I glowed for honesty and freedom”, but eventually falls back
on a repeated stanza: “I set my heart on nothing now”.53 In his autobiography he
observes that the aggressions of the strong are just what we should expect from
human behavior since the beginning of time, and that he was undisturbed by this
pathetic war (PP402-405). In the contemporary study of international relations,
Santayana would be categorized as a realist.
Santayana’s big book about politics, Dominations and Powers, was published
in 1951, although some of the materials in it had been drafted many years earlier.
What is perhaps surprising is that although Santayana spent the World War II years
in Rome, very little is said in the book about World War II, the Nazis, or the Soviet
Union. What is said is very abstract and very compressed. For example, a reference
to “the moral chaos through which the world is now passing” (DP158) could refer
to the war, but it may refer to other things. More obvious, but still distanced from
the passions of the war, is his analysis of militarization: “Recent wars have shown
us,”, he observes, “how easily the moral function of industry can be transformed…
when great works and whole populations have been turned from manufacturing
locomotives and motor-cars to manufacturing bombing aeroplanes and tanks”
(DP177). A lesson of “two general wars on an unprecedented scale” is that “the
intellectual and political world [are] bewildered” (DP246). Really? Is that all that
can be said?
Santayana’s next comment on the two world wars is to blame them (and com-
munism) on the ideas of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the Bible, and German
philosophy: “Only recently, the two German wars and the sudden Russian threat of
universal domination have proved that the classic tradition, passing through the
German philosophy of history, drawn from the Bible, inspired the Russian
John Christian Laursen & Ramón Román Alcalá George Santayana and emotional distance...
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2015): 7-28
22
51 Romano (2012), p. 83.
52 See also García Martín (2002), pp. 134, 135, 137, 141.
53 Santayana (1901), pp. 180-181.
Revolution and guides, most unexpectedly, a militant art of government intended to
dominate the world” (DP274). This is a view of history at its most distant, abstract,
and general. One can hardly blame the Nazis or the communists if they represent
such broad currents of intellectual history, and one is prompted to ask if any west-
ern intellectual current escapes influence from the classics, the Bible, and German
philosophy. It is also probably impossible to confirm or refute history seen in such
broad strokes. Later, Santayana refers to WWII as a “terrible sequel” to WWI
(DP279), and complains about the post-colonial wars after the “general war of
1939-1945” (DP323). He observes that the peoples of northern Europe are not real-
ly very different from each other, which makes their “recent and terrible battles
seem unintelligible” (DP365). But these scattered remarks are not much attention to
the major wars of his day.
Things get more complicated when we try to understand Santayana’s politics,
such as it was, in terms of the main ideologies. In his talks with Lind, he described
himself as a “conservative” and even as a “Tory”.54 And yet as early as 1934 he was
speculating that “the Soviets might be better fitted than any other power to become
the guardians of universal peace”.55 This was because they could fill several
desiderata: they were “theoretically international” and “we are all born proletari-
ans”; because they believe in Historical Materialism they explicitly recognized “the
physical basis of society” [Santayana’s materialism]; and they have an “irresistible
armed force” (DP455). These were important to Santayana because he thought “real
power”, by which he clearly meant military power, would be necessary to create a
world state (DP455). But he also hoped that the Soviets would not interfere in peo-
ple’s “education, religion, manners, and art”: “all culture in the German sense of
this word, must be left to free associations” (DP455). This seems rather naïve.
Reliance on free associations is perhaps one of the defining differences between lib-
eralism and both communism and fascism. But whether this was a realistic assess-
ment of what the Soviets would have done if they came to power as the world gov-
ernment is perhaps beside the point. What it indicates is that Santayana was by no
means a “conservative” as that term is conventionally understood.
Santayana was accused of being both communist and fascist, in part because of
the sympathetic things he said about each of these movements at certain points, and
in part because of his criticism of modern constitutional democracy. Taking the lat-
ter first, he pointed out at some length in Dominations and Powers that modern lib-
eralism really means rule by an oligarchy: rule by the people is only by some of the
people (DP398). He reminded people that rule “of the people” can be read two
ways: “of” in the sense of “by” and “of” in the sense of “over” (DP396). But this
sort of criticism of liberalism has been made by thinkers whose liberal credentials
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55 Chapters 40 and 41 of Book Third of Dominations and Powers were initially published in 1934.
are not usually questioned: Kant said that democracy is rule by all, or not quite all.56
We hesitate to call this an immanent critique, however, because Santayana did his
best to not appear to be arguing from inside anything. His favorable comments on
some aspects of fascism, for example that in Italy it was in part a religious move-
ment, did not mean that he was endorsing it, and certainly not from inside.57 When
he said he was not too worried about the communists, that was because he thought
that their efforts to change human nature and extinguish selfishness would “wither
away” of their own accord in the ordinary course of life (DP254). Despite some ten-
tative positives, most of what he says in Dominations and Powers about commu-
nism is negative (e.g.DP366, 399, 411). It represents the militant order of things, in
contrast to the healthy generative order (DP427, 457). He was, as we have insisted
throughout, always detached and distant, perhaps especially in politics. As he told
Lind, “I’ve never kept in touch with politics”.58
One of the paradoxes of Santayana’s politics is that despite his disclaimers he
did have some emotional and personal impulses in politics, but they can be under-
stood to run in the opposite direction from his philosophy. James Seaton has done
a nice job of showing that several of his letters express sympathy for Franco and
Mussolini, whereas a reading of his contrasts between the “generative” and “mili-
tant” orders in Dominations and Powers implies a rejection of both communism
and fascism in favor of what he elsewhere referred to as “English liberty”.59 It is
almost as if his natural way of thinking and doing was always to argue, emote, and
see both sides of every issue, which would add to his sceptical credentials. 
Some people have believed that the fact that Santayana never returned to the
United States after 1912 suggests that he repudiated the country, its people, or its
politics. And he certainly never refrained from criticizing the naiveté, the hypocrisy,
the consumerism that could be found there. But on the whole his attitude is quite
positive. The pages on the United States in “Character and Opinion in the United
States” of 1920 reflect admiration for the optimism and energy of the people, even
if he did not share them. Some of the last pages of Dominations and Powers
describe the American government as a potential leader of a universal jurisdiction
(DP458). In part, this is because “the American people are good” (DP458). He adds
that the government might not be self-restrained enough to avoid imposing much
more control on the world than it should, but perhaps that is not a surprising criti-
cism (DP459). His last sentence is the rather optimistic speculation that America
might “turn from devising machines to cultivating liberal arts and enlarging moral
freedom” (DP461). Given his life-long penchant for distancing himself from the
John Christian Laursen & Ramón Román Alcalá George Santayana and emotional distance...
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2015): 7-28
24
56 Kant (1991), p. 101. 
57 Lind (1962), p. 113. 
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things he cared about, it could be argued that one of the reasons that Santayana
never returned to the United States was that he loved it too much. 
Throughout his last book, Santayana is never fazed, never rushed, never sad-
dened. It is always a view from afar, maybe far above, with Olympian detachment.
It confirms the idea that he was consistent in both philosophy and politics in main-
taining emotional distance. He was never a close follower of any school of philo-
sophy or politics, and perhaps is best understood as a true eclectic. A picture of
Santayana’s philosophy or politics will almost inevitably be a collage, such as we
have put together in this article. On the whole, he improvised his own philosophy,
and we have noted that he pulled back from the brink of following through on all
of the implications of scepticism, never took much of a stand in politics, and so
forth. The implications that he seems to have carried out with some thoroughness
are those of the philosophical life as he led it. In the search for ataraxia he seems
to have found that distance, emotional coolness, reluctance to commit himself, and
the like were some of his most effective tools. A sceptical smile may well have been
the most emotion he would ever express in matters of philosophy or politics
(SF9).60 Thus he was able to write many books, live in many places, and yet never
really take on the emotional commitments that more involved writers and philosop-
hers have held. He criticized the professional philosophers for their isolation from
the world, but he seems to have managed to live in an ivory tower himself. 
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